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Abstract 
This paper presents trends in parental wealth homogamy across union cohorts formed between 
1987 and 2013 in Denmark. Using high-quality register data on the wealth of parents during the 
year of union formation, we show that the correlation between partners’ levels of parental 
wealth is considerably lower compared to estimates from earlier research on other contexts. 
Nonetheless, parental wealth homogamy is high at the very top of the parental wealth 
distribution, and individuals from wealthy families are relatively unlikely to partner individuals 
from families with low wealth. Even though conclusions regarding trends in parental wealth 
homogamy depend on methodological choices made, most specifications indicate an increase in 
homogamy in the 2000s as compared to the 1990s. This raises concerns about the consequences 
of changes in partnering behavior for wealth inequality between households and social 
boundaries between groups based on parental wealth, in particular between the wealthiest 
individuals in society and the rest of the population.    
 
Partnering behavior is a key determinant of various important aspects of well-being (Schwartz, 
2013). From an economic point of view, marriage and cohabitation create the foundation for the 
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sharing of public goods and specialization in the family, risk pooling, credit and coordination of 
childcare (Browning et al., 2014). It is therefore unsurprising that partnering does not happen at 
random, and that marital sorting is a key feature of marriage models (Becker, 1973, 1991; Lam, 
1988). Social scientists have long documented patterns of assortative mating based on ascribed 
characteristics such as parental occupation and ethnicity (Kalmijn, 1998; Schwartz, 2013), as 
well as on acquired characteristics like education and earnings (Blossfeld, 2009; Pencavel, 1998; 
Rosenfeld, 2008; Schwartz and Mare, 2005; Schwartz, 2010). Besides the impact of partnering 
on individual well-being, assortative mating has been of interest for research on social 
stratification as it potentially impacts the distribution of resources across households and shapes 
boundaries between social groups (Kremer, 1997; Schwartz, 2010; 2013).  
In this article, we study partner selection based on parental wealth, a characteristic that is of 
particular interest for social stratification research for several reasons. First, a substantial amount 
of own wealth is the result of inheritance of parental wealth; a characteristic that is latent, but 
normally not measured at the moment of couple formation, as parents are most often still alive. 
Kopczuk and Lupton’s (2005) review of the literature estimates bequests to make up around 35-
45% of overall wealth of an individual in the United States. High levels of parental wealth 
homogamy may therefore contribute to wealth inequality between households.  Second, wealth 
homogamy can shed light on important questions about intergenerational mobility processes. 
Examples of such questions are: To what extent is it possible to marry out of poverty? Do rich 
families reproduce their accumulated wealth across generations through partnering choices?  
To date, few studies have examined the extent to which partners match on parental wealth. To 
the best of our knowledge, the current literature is limited to a study of parental wealth 
homogamy using data from 1988 for the United States (Charles et al., 2013), and an article on 
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the concentration of inheritances within couples in France during the 1990s and 2000s 
(Fremeaux, 2014). Both studies indicate that people do tend to select partners who are similar to 
themselves in terms of parental wealth. Using the 1988 wave of the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics, Charles et al. (2013) estimated the correlation between parents’ wealth to be about .4 
after controlling for age and race.  
In this study, we contribute to this emerging literature by studying parental wealth homogamy in 
Denmark. We use registry data for marriage and union cohorts formed between 1986 and 2013. 
A major contribution of our work is that we are, to our knowledge, the first to study trends in 
parental wealth homogamy over time. Earlier research is limited to a finding by Fremeaux 
(2014) showing that sorting on inheritances remained stable from 1992 to 2010 in France. The 
focus of our study is on different ways of empirically estimating and interpreting trends in 
parental wealth homogamy. 
Studying parental wealth homogamy is fraught with conceptual and methodological challenges, 
which include the measurement of parental wealth, changes in the composition of wealth across 
time, parental partnering dynamics and selective mortality. Compared to earlier research, we 
believe that our study offers improvements to dealing with these challenges. First, we study 
cohorts in the year of union formation, instead of looking at a cross-section of unions with 
varying union durations. Second, we use intergenerationally linked registry data for the whole 
population with precise measurement of parental wealth. Earlier studies used data on 
inheritances (Fremeaux, 2014) or survey data based on respondents’ estimates of their own and 
spouses’ living parents’ wealth (Charles et al., 2013). Third, we are able to (partly) recover 
information on parental wealth for individuals whose parents passed away before union 
formation. Fourth, parental wealth is measured at the individual rather than the household level 
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in our data, allowing for a more straightforward inclusion of re-married parents. Finally, the 
longitudinal data structure allows us to verify the sensitivity of estimates to the time at which 
parental wealth is measured.  
Before turning to these empirical issues, we provide a brief theoretical discussion as to why 
partners might select each other based on parental wealth, and why the importance of such 
mechanisms might change over time.  
 
Parental Wealth Homogamy: Mechanisms 
According to Kalmijn (1998), partnering homogamy is influenced by i) preferences of 
individuals for partners with certain characteristics, ii) the interference of third parties in the 
selection process, and iii) constraints on the chances of meeting people due to structural factors. 
There are good reasons to expect people to have preferences for partners with high parental 
wealth. Parental wealth can have a positive influence on the attractiveness of potential partners 
not only directly, as parental wealth is likely to be transferred to children (Boserup et al., 2018; 
Killewald et al., 2017; Spilerman, 2000), but also indirectly, as wealth allows parents to invest 
more in their children’s human capital and facilitates access to better health and education (Eads 
& Tach, 2016; Killewald et al., 2018; Pfeffer, 2011; 2018; Pfeffer & Schoeni, 2016; Rauscher, 
2016; Thompson & Conley, 2016).  
Beyond its effect on the attractiveness of potential partners, family wealth is bound to also 
influence tastes, preferences and lifestyles that individuals develop and might therefore lead to 
higher degrees of partnering among individuals with similar parental wealth, even without an 
explicit preference for a partner with high parental wealth(Kalmijn, 1991).  
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As regards the influence of third parties on partner choices, parents are the most obvious party 
interested in the partnering process of their children(Kalmijn, 1998; Rosenfeld & Kim, 2005). 
Parents are bound to be interested in the parental wealth of their child’s partner for similar 
reasons as the ones outlined above. Parents might have direct preferences for seeing their 
children find a partner from a rich family, as this means that their child can potentially access 
partners’ parental wealth at some point, as well as indirect reasons, as parents might have class 
and lifestyle preferences extending to their child’s partner.  
The last group of factors influencing partnering consists of opportunities people have to meet 
people with certain characteristics. Even without any preferences for parental wealth and its 
related characteristics, homogamy might simply arise due to the fact that individuals being born 
into wealthier or poorer families are more likely to be in contact with children from similar 
backgrounds. The reasons for this lie in the effects of parental wealth on residential, educational 
and occupational segregation, lifestyle habits and social networks. That there is residential 
segregation due to parental wealth during childhood and potentially young adulthood is obvious, 
but even when offspring leave the parental home, parental wealth can enable offspring to rent or 
buy residences in richer areas as compared to individuals without parental wealth (Charles & 
Hurst, 2002). Because family wealth also influences the likelihood to go to certain schools and 
universities, social networks built during the educational trajectory will be relatively 
homogenous in terms of parental wealth as well (Blossfeld, 2009).  
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Changes over Time 
It is generally hypothesized that homogamy based on ascribed characteristics (such as parental 
wealth) declines over time, whereas acquired characteristics gain in importance (Kalmijn, 1991). 
Educational expansion, the increasing length of educational careers and increasing geographical 
mobility are expected to have increased the importance of own socioeconomic standing, social 
networks, lifestyles and preferences as compared parental characteristics (Blossfeld, 2009; 
Rosenfeld & Kim, 2005; Schwartz, 2013). Declining levels of homogamy have been observed 
for ascribed characteristics such as parental occupation (Henz & Mills, 2017; Kalmijn, 1991; 
Rosenfeld, 2008). One might therefore expect this pattern to extend to parental wealth 
homogamy too.   
A reason why parental wealth might, on the other hand, have become more important in partner 
searches is that wealth inequality has increased considerably in many Western countries (Piketty, 
2014), including Denmark (Jakobsen et al., 2018). This higher inequality might have made the 
benefits related to wealth stronger and more salient. Studies on income inequality have found 
some support for increased homogamy (Torche, 2010; Monaghan, 2015) and longer partner 
searches (Gould & Passerman 2002) in contexts of high inequality. Further increased inequality 
can also lead to differences in tastes and behaviours related to wealth to become more 
pronounced and augment residential segregation, thus reducing the opportunities to meet 
individuals with different family backgrounds (Smith et al., 2014).  
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Our Study: Parental Wealth Homogamy in Denmark 
In this paper we study trends in parental wealth homogamy in Denmark from 1987 to 2013. Not 
all mechanisms discussed above might be equally applicable to Denmark. Even though income 
inequality is relatively low in Denmark, wealth inequality appears to be relatively high in 
comparison to other Western countries (Balestra & Tonkin, 2018). This might make wealth a 
relatively important socioeconomic factor in the partnering process. Wealth inequality increased 
slightly over the period studied (Jakobsen et al., 2018) which might therefore have increased the 
importance of such considerations. At the same time, the intergenerational transmission of 
wealth in Denmark is lower compared to the United States (Boserup et al., 2013), which might in 
turn reduce preferences of individuals for partners with high parental wealth. Even though the 
greatest expansion of tertiary education in Denmark took place before the 1980s, rates of tertiary 
education attendance have risen steadily between 1980 and 2010 (Barro and Lee, 2015). 
Educational expansion might therefore have increased the possibilities to date across parental 
wealth boundaries, as tertiary education became less restricted to a select group of individuals.  
 
Data and Method 
Data on the complete population residing in Denmark in the years 1986-2013 come from several 
public administration registers compiled by Statistics Denmark based on unique personal 
identification numbers at birth. Tax registries in Denmark collect data on the value of 
individuals’ assets and liabilities, mostly provided by third parties (e.g. assessments of housing 
values are made by the tax authorities). Denmark taxed wealth until 1996, but the collection of 
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wealth data continued with some slight modifications after its abolishment (Jakobsen et al., 
2018). Information from population registers allows us to link parents to children. 
Our sample includes all different-sex co-residing unions formed during the period 1986-2013. 
Union formation is determined based on the entry into co-residence of two individuals who were 
either married, had a registered partnership, cohabited with children or cohabited without 
children (Drefahl, 2012).
1
 A requirement for inclusion in our sample is the presence of parental 
identification numbers of the father and the mother of both individuals, allowing us to link 
parents to children in the registry data. Such parental identification numbers have been 
systematically recorded for all individuals born after 1960, but are incomplete for earlier birth 
cohorts (Boserup et al., 2013).
2
 We therefore restrict our sample to couples where both partners 
are aged between 18 and 34 years old at the time of union formation. In robustness checks we 
expand this age range to 40, but restrict the period covered by our analysis to 1992-2013.
3
 
Finally, we exclude couples where one of the parents was not present in the registry data after 
1980 (the first year we have information on wealth). Parents are not present in the registry data if 
they have passed away or live abroad.  
Parental Wealth 
Wealth is measured as total assets (financial assets and housing) minus debts as retrieved by 
Statistics Denmark from data collected by the Danish Tax Agency. Wealth comprises a large 
                                                          
1
 This latter category only includes households of two unrelated adults who had an age difference of less than 15 
years and who were not related by family ties. A small minority of cases might therefore not regard romantically 
involved individuals. In robustness checks we exclude unions that lasted less than 3 years to filter out such possible 
arrangements as much as possible; see figure B2 in the Online Appendix, results do not change.  
2
 Figure A1 in the Online Appendix shows the distribution of cases that had no parental identification numbers by 
age and year. There we also discuss various robustness checks that reduced concerns that a changing age 
composition of the sample affected results (e.g. including sample weights to compensate for possible unequal 
probabilities of inclusion by birth year)   
3
 Online Appendix B1; Results are robust. 
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variety of sources including the value of properties such as houses, boats and cars; bonds; stocks; 
cash in banks; value of businesses; loans; and mortgages. One component not included in the 
measurement of wealth is accumulated pension wealth. Most information is provided by third 
parties such as banks, financial institutions and other governmental bodies. The value of 
properties is assessed by tax authorities based on detailed information of their characteristics 
(Boserup et al., 2013).
4
 During the observation period, there are changes in how some sources of 
wealth are reported, mainly due to the removal of the wealth tax in 1996. Specifically, the value 
of stocks was self-reported until 1996 but provided by financial institutions ever since, some 
assets that were self-reported until 1996 were not recorded anymore after that (including cars, 
boats, caravans) and the registration of company values changed several times until 1997 
(Jakobsen et al., 2018). Boserup and colleagues (2013) exploited an overlap in both ways of 
measuring wealth to show how the measurement of wealth from 1997 onward was well 
approximated by the measurement of wealth up to that point.   
Wealth is measured at the individual level, and we therefore sum the wealth of parents regardless 
of marital status. Parental wealth is measured separately for male and female partners. Following 
earlier research (Solon, 2004) we average parental wealth across three years. So far our 
theoretical discussion, as well as existing research on parental wealth homogamy (Charles et al., 
2013; Fremeaux, 2014), has treated parental wealth as a stable characteristic of individuals. In 
reality, however, parental wealth changes over time. This poses conceptual as well as 
methodological challenges on when and how to best measure parental wealth. Wealth depends 
on time-varying processes such as housing prices, stock market fluctuations, individual earnings 
                                                          
4
 Tax assessed housing values have historically not always reflected fully the market values at the time. Following 
Boserup et al. (2013) and Browning et al. (2013), we adjust tax assessed housing values with a factor that reflects 
the average relationship between market values of traded houses and average tax assessed values, thus arriving at an 
imputed estimate of the market value of housing wealth. 
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and consumption patterns, as well as windfalls or unlucky events. A family’s position in the 
wealth distribution therefore depends on the time of measurement. This raises the question when 
wealth of parents should be measured. We therefore consider parental wealth at different points 
in time.
5
  
If one considers parental wealth as an economic resource that children signal directly to future 
partners and which holds the potential of joint future consumption, wealth parents have at the 
time of union formation might be the best indicator to employ. We therefore employ parental 
wealth in the year of union formation as the first measure used in the analysis. To construct this 
variable we normalize
6
 the sum of fathers’ and mothers’ wealth. Subsequently, we create a 
distribution of parental wealth for each yearly union cohort and rank parents’ wealth, resulting in 
a non-integer distribution ranging from 0 to 100 for each cohort. In robustness checks, we log 
transform the total sum of parental wealth in the year of union formation, instead of using a rank-
based measure.  
A problem with measuring parental wealth at union formation is that wealth is highly dependent 
on age. Individuals in general accumulate wealth throughout adulthood with wealth peaking 
around age 60, after which levels of wealth start declining (Killewald et al., 2017). An individual 
with young parents might therefore have low parental wealth at union formation, but this might 
be a poor predictor of parents’ wealth in the future, and hence, the volume of expected transfers 
and inheritances. The second measure we employ therefore indicates parental wealth in the year 
of union formation normalized by father’s age. In this case, before calculating the rank of 
parental wealth within a given union cohort, parental wealth is normalized separately by father’s 
                                                          
5
 All wealth and income components are deflated with a GDP deflator to the 2010 price level. 
6
 Normalization allows for the inclusion of parental wealth from earlier waves in the case parents had passed away at 
union formation, see subsequent paragraphs.  
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age. This measure therefore indicates wealth of parents relative to peers from their specific birth 
cohorts. This measure also accounts, to some extent, for changes in the distribution of age at 
union formation as older individuals are likely to have older parents on average.  
A final alternative is to consider parental wealth as a socialization factor that shapes individuals’ 
preferences and lifestyles and determines interpersonal networks while growing up. In this case, 
a parents' relative wealth position during childhood and adolescence might be the best indicator 
to use. The third measure employed therefore indicates parental wealth at age 18. In this case 
parental wealth is taken from the year where respondents were aged 18, and subsequently 
normalized and ranked by an individual’s own age in the year of union formation. This test also 
allows us to address the potential bias accruing from a possible endogeneity of the timing of 
marriage, implying that some individuals may postpone marriage to obtain more reliable 
information about their prospective partner’s wealth. Due to the more strict data requirements, 
the sample used for this measure differs from the sample used with the two other wealth 
measures.  
Besides the time at which parental wealth is measured, there are two other main issues 
complicating the empirical measurement of empirical wealth. Firstly, parents might have passed 
away before wealth is measured. Fremeaux (2014) tackled this issue in his study on inheritance 
homogamy by combining information on inheritances received with estimates of expected 
inheritances. Charles and colleagues (2013) did not have information on the wealth of parents 
who passed away. Our partial solution is to measure parental wealth in the last wave before 
union formation where both parents were still alive.
7
 In robustness checks, we exclude cases 
                                                          
7
 Parental wealth is in these cases normalized in the year both parents were still alive and this value is subsequently 
used in the calculation of the parental wealth rank for each yearly union cohort.  
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where a parent passed away before union formation. Our measure of parental wealth at age 18 
excludes cases where parents had passed away before age 18. 
Secondly, parents might not be together anymore at the time of union formation. If parents re-
partner, household-based measures of wealth might complicate arriving at a comparable measure 
of parental wealth for individuals whose parents did and did not form new families. Charles and 
colleagues (2013) therefore excluded individuals with re-married parents. Danish registry data 
allow for the measurement of wealth at the individual level, enabling us to sum parents’ 
individual wealth and to disregard the wealth of eventual new partners of the parents. In 
robustness checks, couples with one or more re-married parents are excluded from the analysis.  
 
Sample Description 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the overall sample of 803,185 couples with full 
information on parental wealth in the year of union formation. Besides descriptive statistics for 
the sample overall, averages are presented for unions formed in 1987 and 2013 to monitor 
changes over time in the composition of the sample. The descriptive statistics show that men are 
on average older than women at union formation, and the same applies to their parents. Ages of 
all individuals involved have slightly increased during the observation period. Only 6% of 
couples were married at union formation, preventing us from performing a separate analysis on a 
subsample of marriages. We treat married and cohabiting couples as one group as cohabitation as 
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an alternative to marriage is widespread in Denmark.
8
 Parental wealth is higher for men’s parents 
as compared to women’s parents.  
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Couples at Union Formation; N = 803,185 
 
All Sample  1987  2013 
Variable Mean SD  Mean  Mean 
Female Partners’ Characteristics       
Age 24.3 3.6  23.3  24.4 
Education:   ISCED 1-2 .32 .47  .44  .29 
                    ISCED 3-4 .54 .50  .47  .51 
                    ISCED 5-6 .14 .34  .09  .20 
Mother’s Age   50.7 6.1  49.0  52.4 
Father’s Age  53.5 6.7  52.4  55.0 
Married at Union Formation .06 .23  .09  .04 
Foreign Born .01 .09  .00  .02 
Parents’ Annual Wealth at Offspring Union Formation (x10000 kr.) 91.5 422.7  59.9  72.9 
Parents’ 3-year Average Wealth at Union Formation (x10000 kr.) 87.6 496.4  70.1  74.8 
   Parents’ 3-year Average Wealth at Union Formation Negative .27 .45  0.20  0.39 
       
Male Partners’ Characteristics       
Age 26.1 3.7  25.3  26.1 
Education:   ISCED 1-2 .27 .45  .33  .27 
                    ISCED 3-4 .58 .49  .57  .55 
                    ISCED 5-6 .14 .35  .10  .19 
Mother’s Age   52.4 6.1  51.3  54.7 
Father’s Age  55.2 6.7  53.7  56.4 
Married at Union Formation .05 .22  .08  .04 
Foreign Born .01 .10  .00  .02 
Parents’ Annual Wealth at Offspring Union Formation (x10000 kr.) 99.2 470.7  68.5  87.6 
Parents’ 3-year Average Wealth at Union Formation (x10000 kr.) 95.4 422.1  78.9  88.9 
   Parents’ 3-year Average Wealth at Union Formation Negative .25 .43  .18  .35 
       
Parents’ Characteristics       
Married to Other Parent at Offspring Union Formation .67 .35  .77  .56 
Cohabiting with Other Parent at Offspring Union Formation .02 .09  .01  .03 
Single or Widow(er) at Offspring Union Formation .16 .23  .12  .21 
Re-Partnered at Offspring Union Formation .05 .12  .04  .07 
Re-Married at Offspring Union Formation .10 .18  .07  .12 
Note. Descriptive statistics for sample with information on 3-year average wealth at union formation. Both male and 
female partner aged between 18 and 34 at union formation. Data for the year 2013 is missing for education, the 
value in the 2013 column is for 2012. 
                                                          
8 In 2018, one in four Danish couples were cohabiting rather than married, and the same cohabitation rate applies to 
couples with children. Reference?; We run robustness checks excluding short cohabitation spells (<3 years).  
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25% of parents report negative wealth and this share increased with time from 18% in 1987 to 
35% in 2013Negative wealth can arise due to recent investments made, accumulated debts, or 
due to a mismatch between the value of houses as estimated by the authorities and the real 
market value of a property.
9
 We pay particular attention to cases with negative parental wealth in 
the analysis. Due to the precise measurement of wealth, very few couples had zero wealth (less 
than 0.2% of cases). Figure 1 breaks down the wealth of the male partners’ parents into housing 
assets, financial assets, and debt. Housing assets make up most of wealth across the distribution, 
even though financial assets become more visible at the top of the wealth distribution.
10
 The 
Figure also shows high levels of debt and assets at the very bottom of the distribution. Very low 
levels of wealth might therefore indicate recent investments made rather than an economically 
difficult situation (Killewald, 2013)..  
Figure 2 shows trends in median and median absolute wealth over time. Median and mean 
wealth declined very slightly until the mid-1990s, took off dramatically after that, and decreased 
considerably after the onset of the financial crisis. Figure 3 documents how inequality measured 
by the Gini coefficient in parental wealth followed an opposite pattern with increasing inequality 
until the early 1990s, a brief decline followed by stabilization and a subsequent increase in recent 
years. On average, the Gini coefficient in wealth over the period observed is around .7, which is  
 
                                                          
9
 Information on housing values should in principle reflect market values for comparable traded houses. However, as 
the majority of houses are not traded each year, the estimated market values of houses may be too low (or low), 
which can happen because specific characteristics such as e.g. interior design (new kitchen or bathrooms) are not 
taken into account by valuation authorities. Thus, the higher actual market values can translate into higher 
mortgages as compared to the value of the house as indicated by the data.  
10
 With financial deregulation and various reforms through the 1990s and early 2000s, house owners access to e.g. 
refinancing their mortgage debt implied on average an increase in debt in relation to housing values (Browning et al. 
2013). 
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Figure 1. Composition of wealth by parental wealth percentile 
 
Note. Pooled sample 1987-2013; Within-cohort wealth percentiles. N = 803,185 
 
Figure 2. Median and average parental wealth by year 
 
Note. Average (solid lines) and median (dashed lines) sum of parental wealth at year of union formation. N = 
803,185. Due to data restrictions, the median is approximated by taking the sum of the 48
th
 to 52
nd
 percentile divided 
by five; Wealth is measured in 2010 price levels. 
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in accordance with other studies of wealth inequality (Danish Economic Council, 2016; Balestra 
& Tonkin, 2018). 
Figure 3. Inequality in untransformed parental wealth (at union formation) by year (Gini) 
 
 
Note. Three-year averaged parental wealth at year of union formation. N = 803,185 
 
 
Procedure 
As the main aim of our analysis is descriptive in nature, most of our analysis will concentrate on 
the challenges of empirically estimating trends in parental homogamy. We consider factors that 
can explain why parental homogamy changed to be out of the scope of the current paper, and 
leave such issues for future research including the role of changes in educational homogamy. We 
commence the analysis by describing the association between partners’ parental wealth. Firstly, 
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we document the relative frequency of couple combinations based on men’s and women’s 
parental wealth percentiles using a heatmap. Secondly, we show average male partner’s parental 
wealth according to the female partner’s parental wealth. This will give insights into whether 
there exists a non-linear relationship or not. After describing assortative mating patterns, we 
summarize the strength of assortative mating using correlations and document how the 
correlation in partners’ parental wealth has changed over time. We subsequently answer the 
question to what extent the time at which parental wealth is measured matters for conclusions. 
Finally, we test the robustness of these trends to various other choices regarding the measures 
used and sample restrictions applied. A main goal has been to make our results as comparable as 
possible to earlier results on the United States (Charles et al., 2013) in order to compare levels of 
parental homogamy across Denmark and the US.  
 
Results 
Figure 4 provides an indication of how frequently men and women with given levels of parental 
wealth form a union together. The graph depicts the joint distribution of parental wealth by 
percentiles, showing males on the x-axis and females on the y-axis. For each percentile in the 
male ranking, a random distribution of marriages would imply that exactly 1 percent of these 
would be to a woman in each of the 100 percentiles in the female parental wealth distribution. 
We estimated how large the actual proportions of couples found in each 100*100 cell were in the 
joint partnering distribution. A value of 1 in Figure 4 thus indicates an observed frequency that 
would be expected if partnering were to be at random, a value of 2 indicates a relative frequency 
that is twice greater than expected. Red areas indicate relatively common combinations (more 
than 2.5 times the probability of the random match), whereas blue areas are relatively less 
18 
 
common (less than the probability of the random match); light-green and light-blue areas fall in 
between those two extremes.  
Figure 4. Heatmap of relative frequency of particular couple combinations based on parental 
wealth 1987-2013 
 
Note. Parental wealth percentile at union formation within union cohort. Frequency indicates relative frequency of 
combination of parental wealth percentiles; a value of one indicates relative frequency as expected based on random 
mating. Pooled results for complete period 1987-2013. N = 803,185 
The graph shows high relative frequencies along the diagonal, indicating positive assortative 
mating, and a concentration of couples in the top-right corner, indicating couples where both his 
and her parents are among the wealthiest parents of their union cohorts. At the same time, the 
clustering of dark-blue areas in the top-left and bottom-right corners indicate that individuals 
from the wealthiest families are relatively unlikely to partner with individuals from families that 
are roughly in the bottom 30% of the wealth distributions. In other words, individuals from the 
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wealthiest families are the most likely to form homogenous partnerships, and they especially 
avoid partnering with individuals from families with low levels of wealth.  
One peculiarity is formed by the green areas observed along the x- and y-axes which indicate the 
likelihood to partner with an individual from the very bottom of the parental wealth distribution. 
These individuals have parents who have the largest amounts of negative wealth. This could 
reflect that debt can also indicate access to credit rather than a severely disadvantaged economic 
situation (Killewald, 2013). Given that a large portion of debt is mortgage debt or other debt that 
requires collateral, these might be parents who just made an investment in a business or bought a 
new house. Moreover, as previously mentioned, negative wealth might also reflect that housing 
values in the data sometimes underestimate the true market values.  
To further describe patterns of parental wealth homogamy, The left panel of Figure 5 shows the 
average parental wealth percentile of male partners according to female partners’ parental wealth 
percentile for three groups of union cohorts. In general, the more parental wealth female partners 
have, the higher the parental wealth of their male partner. The right panel shows a smoothened 
line indicating the general pattern for three different cohorts. The tendency for partners’ parental 
wealth to go up with own parental wealth appears to be stronger for more recent union cohorts. 
The largest differences in average parental wealth observed amount up to 12 percentiles of men’s 
parental wealth. An exception to the general positive association in parental wealth is observed 
for women with very low parental wealth whose partners’ average parental wealth is not as low 
as one might expect. As mentioned, this is likely due to some values of negative wealth 
indicating access to credit rather than a difficult economic situation. 
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Figure 4. Average Men’s Parental Wealth Percentile at Union Formation by Women’s Parental 
Wealth Percentile at Union Formation 
 
Note. Left pane: Average wealth percentile of male parents calculated separately for each percentile of female 
partners’ parental wealth. Right pane: Smoothened line based on dots of left pane.  
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Correlation in ranks 
In the following, we estimate the correlation in wealth. We first look at correlations in ranks, and 
we then carry on to analyzing the correlation in the natural log of wealth, following the approach 
in Charles et al. (2013).Figure 6 further summarizes the previously described associations and 
provides the main result of our paper: trends in the correlation between partners’ parental wealth 
by yearly union cohort. The graph shows that correlations are relatively small across the period 
and range between 0.04 and 0.19. In general, the correlation appears highest when measuring 
parental wealth in the year of union formation (but not normalizing by father’s age).   
 
Figure 6. Correlation between her and his parental wealth at union formation by year 
 
Note. Year Percentile = Parental Wealth Measured at Union Formation, rank within union cohort; Year and age 
percentile = Parental Wealth Measured at Union Formation, normalized by paternal age within a given union cohort, 
and subsequently ranked within union cohort; Percentile Age 18 = Parental wealth measured at age 18, normalized 
for age cohort, ranked within union cohort. N = 803,185 
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Two measures show a slight decline in the correlation in the early 1990s, with the lowest 
correlations observed between 0.04 and 0.08. This is followed by steady increases observed for 
all three measures thereafter and correlations peak at around 0.15-0.19 depending on the measure 
considered. When using parental wealth at union formation in both its forms (i.e. rank within the 
cohort, or rank within the cohort and paternal age groups) the correlation declines in recent 
years. When measuring parental wealth at age 18, the correlation keeps increasing until the end 
of the observation period.  
Even though a generally consistent trend of increasing parental wealth homogamy is observed 
across measures, there are some more subtle differences in the results depending on the measure 
employed, particularly once parental wealth is measured at age 18. Do the different estimates 
based on parental wealth at 18 indicate that parental wealth during adolescence has a different 
effect on partnering than parental wealth at union formation? This is certainly a possibility. 
However, there might also be changes in the composition of wealth across periods that drive 
results. For instance, parental wealth at age 18 is primarily measured before the financial crisis, 
and the financial crisis might have changed the composition of wealth in ways that affect the 
parental wealth correlation. To illustrate, negative parental wealth might both indicate an 
economically precarious situation but also access to credit (Killewald, 2013). If the share of 
negative wealth changes over time, as Table 1 shows was the case in the period we observe, this 
might affect the parental wealth correlation even if partnering behavior remains constant.  
More generally, how well parental wealth measured at a given point in time measures long-term 
family wealth (or other latent characteristics that affect partnering) might change across periods. 
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For example, in periods of high wealth inequality, differences between families in wealth are 
more pronounced which might make wealth at a given point in time more indicative of long-term 
access to wealth. These points raise the following questions: Are the trends we observe driven by 
periodic changes in the composition and characteristics of parental wealth and its distribution? 
Or are trends driven by actual changes in partnering behavior?  
To test this argument, we further scrutinize the sensitivity of our results to the time at which 
parental wealth is measured in Figure 7. The blue line reproduces our original correlations of 
parental wealth measured at union formation (as observed in Figure 6; normalized by union 
cohort only). The red line displays parental wealth homogamy for couples that were formed five 
years earlier (i.e. five years before the year indicated on the x-axis). But, instead of measuring 
parental wealth during the year of union formation, parental wealth is measured five years after 
union formation. Given that this red line measures parental wealth homogamy for couples 
formed five years earlier, we should in principle observe a five-year lag in the parental wealth 
homogamy trend. On the other hand, if our results are an artefact of the calendar year in which 
parental wealth is measured (due to period changes in the characteristics of wealth), we should 
not observe a lag in the time trend over time at all once changing the couples for whom parental 
wealth homogamy is measured in a given calendar year.  
The red line indicates that parental wealth homogamy trends move by several years once 
estimating parental wealth homogamy for couples formed five years before a given calendar 
year. To aid interpretation, the grey line is added to Figure 7 which lags the original correlations 
in parental wealth homogamy (the blue line) with five years.  
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Figure 7. Sensitivity of parental wealth correlation to time of measurement 
 
Note. Blue line = Correlation in parental wealth measured at union formation, rank within union cohort; Grey line = 
Correlation in parental wealth measured at union formation for couples formed five years before year of reference; 
Red line = Correlation in parental wealth measured five years after union formation for couples formed five years 
before year of reference.  
 
It can be observed that the red line is close to the grey line for most of the observation period (the 
beginning of the observation period being an exception). This indicates that we observe very 
similar substantive conclusions regardless of whether we measure parental wealth in the year of 
union formation or five years after union formation. Results are especially robust for the 
increases in homogamy observed during the 2000s. This reduces concerns that the increases in 
parental wealth homogamy observed are driven by a changing composition of wealth across 
calendar time and increases confidence in an interpretation that partnering changed over time.   
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At the same time, results are less uniform for the early 1990s. It is therefore more complicated to 
conclude that partnering behavior changed from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. This illustrates 
that care has to be taken once interpreting correlations in parental wealth and comparing 
correlations across time and space. Indeed, this is a recommendation in general for research on 
wealth and trends in its effects over time. 
 
Robustness checks and comparison with Charles and colleagues’ estimates 
The main results documented so far would lead to two substantive conclusions: 1) estimates of 
parental wealth homogamy appear much lower in Denmark as compared to earlier estimates for 
the United States (Charles et al., 2013), but 2) parental wealth homogamy has become stronger 
over time. In the remainder of this results section we scrutinize both claims further. We present 
various robustness checks that will simultaneously make our results more comparable to those of 
Charles and co-authors’ estimates for the United States.  
In the remainder of the analysis, we take our results based on parental wealth measured at union 
formation (normalized by year) as the benchmark. This benchmark result is the blue line in the 
first graph of Figure 8, and is identical to the one displayed in Figure 6. Figure 8 makes our 
results more comparable to the preferred estimate of Charles and colleagues in a step-by-step 
fashion.  
First, we exclude cases where a parent had passed away before union formation, but for whom 
we recovered parental wealth information from earlier waves. Results are practically identical.  
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Figure 8. Replication of main results using various specifications and sample restrictions 
 
Note. Graphs gradually add sample restrictions or model specifications. Each graph displays reproduces the red line 
of the previous graph in blue, and shows the additional change in estimates once adding the sample restriction/model 
specification referred to through the red dashed line. Without Imputation = Blue line is correlation in parental wealth 
measured at union formation, rank within union cohort; Red line is as blue line but excluding cases where a parent 
passed away before union formation; Excluding negatives = Red line as without imputation but also excludes 
individuals with negative wealth from the sample; Percentile to Log Income = As Excluding Negatives but uses 
logged absolute parental wealth rather than parental wealth rank. Excluding Separated Couples = As Percentile to 
Log Income but excluding individuals whose parents re-married before union formation. Regression = As excluding 
separated couples but OLS regression coefficients rather than correlations. Controls = As Regression but including 
controls for mothers’ age, fathers’ age, his age, her age, he foreign born and she foreign born.  
 
Second, we also exclude cases where parental wealth was negative in the year of union 
formation. Given that Charles and colleagues estimate of a 0.4 correlation relied on a measure of 
logged wealth wealth, that correlation is based on a sample excluding cases with negative wealth. 
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Once we exclude such cases with negative wealth from our analysis, the correlation drops for 
recent periods and trends over time become less pronounced. The reason for this weakening of 
the time trend can be found in Figure 4. Two particularly strong patterns of assortative mating 
arose from that heatmap: individuals from wealthy families partnering each other, and 
individuals from wealthy families avoiding individuals from families with low wealth. Excluding 
negative values largely takes out the latter part of the story from the data (i.e. negative wealth 
covers many of the dark blue areas of Figure 4). Figure B3 available online displays an animated 
heatmap of how assortative mating patterns developed across union cohorts. It can be observed 
that individuals from the wealthiest families are increasingly less likely to partner individuals 
from families with low wealth and increasingly likely to partner at the top of the wealth 
distribution. Excluding negative wealth therefore excludes the former part of the story from the 
estimates and flattens the trend in parental wealth homogamy over time.    
Third, instead of normalizing and calculating the rank of parental wealth at union formation, we 
log transform 3-year average wealth at union formation for the sample excluding cases with 
negative parental wealth and cases with parents who passed away before union formation. 
Results are consistent, but the drop observed during the crisis years for the other measures now 
becomes less pronounced.  
Fourth, following Charles and colleagues we also exclude cases with re-married parents, for 
whom the measurement in the United States data was not ideal. This specification does not 
change the conclusion that parental wealth homogamy in Denmark hovers around a correlation 
of 0.1, the time trend in the correlation is slightly more pronounced in this specification.  
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Fifth, switching from correlations to regression coefficients does not affect results. However, 
once adding controls for parents’ ages, partners’ ages and whether partners are foreign born in 
the final graph of Figure 8, the correlation between partners’ parental wealth is reduced. In 
addition, the upward trend in the parental wealth association now largely disappears. Additional 
analysis (available upon request), indicated that controlling for parental ages shifts down the 
correlation across the period studied; a result also observed in Figure 6 once standardizing by 
father’s age. The change in the time trend of coefficients is mainly produced by the inclusion of 
the two control variables for whether the male and female partner are foreign born. This might 
indicate that foreign born individuals are especially likely to form homogomous unions in terms 
of parental wealth, and that their share has been increasing (see Table 1). This final specification 
of Figure 8 represents the estimate that is closest to the specification presented by Charles and 
colleagues (2013). Further robustness checks included the exclusion of short cohabitation spells 
and the widening of the age range used for sample selection; results were robust to these further 
checks and are displayed in Online Appendix B. 
In sum, the general conclusion that parental wealth homogamy in Denmark appears relatively 
low as compared to the 0.4 estimate for the United States (Charles et al., 2013) is robust across 
specifications. It has to be noted, however, that we are not able to gauge the possible influence of 
the different data sources used (survey data instead of registry data) as well as differences in 
sample selection (union cohorts versus a cross-section of unions intact at a given point in time).  
The second conclusion of increasing parental wealth homogamy over time is less robust to the 
different sample selections and specifications chosen. Even though our initial estimates indicate 
an increase in homogamy across union cohorts, no trend is observed in the specification where 
all sample restrictions are applied and all controls are included. The increasing trend in 
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homogamy disappears once both excluding cases with negative wealth and once controlling for 
immigration status of the partners. Given that the former sample restriction selectively excludes 
parts from the analysis, and given that the latter forms an explanation for trends in homogamy 
over time, we would argue that there is some support for the statement that parental wealth 
homogamy has been increasing over time. However, given the sensitivity of results to the model 
specification applied we leave such claims for the discussion section.  
 
Discussion 
Who partners whom has been a central question for social scientists for several decades. 
Repeatedly, they have shown that partners match based on a variety of ascribed and acquired 
characteristics (Becker, 1973, 1991; Blossfeld, 2009; Browning et al., 2014; Kalmijn, 1998; 
Lam, 1988; Schwartz, 2013; Weiss & Willis, 1998). So far, surprisingly little attention has been 
paid to assortative mating based on parental wealth. Previous research on survey data from the 
United States estimated that parental wealth homogamy is relatively strong (Charles et al., 2013). 
High levels of parental wealth homogamy are likely to be consequential for wealth inequality 
between households, the transmission of family wealth across generations, and might be an 
indication of family wealth shaping boundaries between social groups. A major open question is 
therefore whether earlier findings of strong parental wealth homogamy hold once applied to a 
different setting and once using more accurate data.  
In this paper, we show that the correlation in partners’ parental wealth in Denmark is relatively 
weak. Correlations range between 0.04 and 0.19, depending on the measure employed and the 
time period considered. This result stands in contrast with the 0.4 correlation found by Charles 
and colleagues (2013) for the United States. In general, one might have expected parental wealth 
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homogamy to be lower in Denmark due to its relatively low levels of intergenerational 
transmission of wealth (indeed, low parental wealth homogamy might be a possible mechanism 
weakening this transmission). However, the difference in the estimates between both countries is 
much larger as found for cross-national differences in the intergenerational transmission of 
wealth (Boserup et al., 2013). In addition, the relatively high levels of wealth inequality in 
Denmark (Balestra & Tonkin, 2018) would lead to the expectation that wealth can be an 
important factor to be considered once making partner choices in Denmark too.  
One might therefore question whether the large gap in estimates observed between studies 
reflects actual cross-national differences or whether variation in research design has led to a 
relatively large gap in estimates between studies. Even though we aimed at making our estimates 
comparable to those of Charles and colleagues (2013) – which actually led to even lower 
estimates of parental wealth homogamy - remaining major differences include the use of registry 
data instead of survey data and the study of unions in the year of formation rather than a cross-
sectional selection of unions intact at a given point in time. More research is needed to 
understand whether the different types of data and empirical strategies employed affect results or 
not. But regardless of the reasons why, the main take-away point is that levels of parental wealth 
homogamy in Denmark are considerably weaker than what one might have expected based on 
estimates from previous research.  
Nonetheless, even if levels of parental wealth homogamy are relatively low, this does not mean 
that assortative mating based on parental wealth is of little concern. Firstly, we found parental 
wealth homogamy to be particularly strong among partners from the wealthiest families. Given 
that a large share of wealth is owned by the top 10% of wealthiest households (Jakobsen et al., 
2018), a concentration of parental wealth homogamy at the top can be  consequential for wealth 
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inequality, even if parental wealth homogamy is relatively low for the parental wealth 
distribution overall. Future research can explore further how consequential patterns of assortative 
mating based on parental wealth are for the distribution of wealth across households.  
Secondly, even though levels of parental wealth homogamy were estimated to be relatively low 
in the early 1990s in Denmark, various estimations showed a steady increase in assortative 
mating during the late 1990s and the 2000s. Even though not all specifications showed the same 
trend in parental wealth homogamy over time, our preferred estimates suggest that there is an 
increasing tendency of homogamy among the very wealthy, as well as a decreasing likelihood of 
the very wealthy to partner with individuals from families with low wealth. These developments 
might lead to increasing social distances between the very wealthy (e.g. the “one per-cent”) and 
those with little wealth in society. We also found indications that the increasing share of foreign 
born individuals might have contributed to increased levels of parental wealth homogamy, as 
foreign born individuals might both have less parental wealth and might encounter obstacles to 
partner with native-born individuals. It has to be noted, however, that the increases in the share 
of foreign born individuals in our sample were relatively modest, and that additional possible 
interpretations of this result might therefore be needed to explain its impact on parental wealth 
homogamy trends.
11
Future studies can further corroborate whether parental wealth homogamy 
has indeed been increasing and which mechanisms underlie these trends. If the conclusion of 
increasing parental wealth homogamy can be confirmed, this trend might not only be of concern 
for questions of wealth inequality, it is also surprising from a theoretical perspective. Most 
previous accounts of changes over time in the importance of parental characteristics suggested 
                                                          
11
 Note also that due to our sample construction, these are foreign born individuals whose parents are in the sample. 
In other words, parents have to live in Denmark in order to measure parental wealth. Our analysis therefore largely 
excludes foreign born individuals who came to Denmark without their parents.  
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that the importance of ‘ascribed characteristics’ such as parental socioeconomic status decreased 
in importance over time (e.g. Kalmijn, 1991; Rosenfeld, 2008). Our study has shown that 
parental wealth might be an important exception.  
A main objective of our study was to document the influence of various methodological choices 
made once estimating trends in assortative mating based on parental wealth. In this regard, 
several choices appeared relatively inconsequential for our results such as the recovery of 
information on parental wealth from parents who had passed away at the time of union 
formation, the exclusion of short cohabitation spells, and using a log transformation instead of 
ranks. At the same time, other choices appeared to be important for in the conclusions of our 
study.  
Firtstly, the choice of when to measure parental wealth. Parental wealth is a time-varying 
measure and the extent to which it is an indicator of long-term access to economic resources is 
likely to vary across periods (e.g. with the business cycle). Our analysis revealed that the 
increases in parental wealth homogamy observed between the 1990s and 2000s were not 
sensitive to the time of measurement. On the other hand, this appeared to be less the case for the 
decreasing trend in homogamy found for the start of our observation window. A 
recommendation for future research is therefore to take particular care once interpreting and 
comparing correlations in parental wealth, and indeed the correlation of wealth with any 
characteristic, across time and space.  
Secondly, the exclusion of cases with negative wealth changed the estimated time trend in 
parental wealth homogamy. Even though excluding such cases might be motivated by 
methodological choices (e.g. a preference for logged transformed wealth rather than ranks) or 
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data constraints (e.g. wealth is often only available on the household level complicating the 
inclusion of re-married parents), the results of this paper have shown that they are consequential 
for the substantive conclusions reached. It is therefore recommendable for future research to pay 
particular attention to how estimates of parental wealth homogamy can be made comparable 
across studies and contexts.  
To conclude, this study has shown that  parental wealth homogamy in Denmark is lower than 
what one would have expected based on earlier research. At the same time, homogamy appears 
to be strong at the top of the parental wealth distribution. This might be particularly 
consequential for wealth inequality between households as most wealth in society is concentrated 
at the very top. Furthermore, there are indications that parental wealth homogamy has been 
increasing over time. There hence appear to be social boundaries between the wealthiest in 
society and the rest of the population and these boundaries might have become stronger over 
time. This study therewith underlines that assortative mating is an important topic for research on 
wealth inequality. In addition, the results illustrate that studying assortative mating in parental 
wealth is an important future avenue of research that will us help understanding who partners 
with whom and which social boundaries between groups exist in society today.  
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Graphs/Tables for Appendix 
A. Presence of Parental Identification Numbers and Parents in the Registry Data 
The requirement for inclusion in the sample of our study was the identification of both parents in 
the wealth data. Parents were not identified in the data if: 1) Parental identification numbers were 
not available that allowed us to link parents to children in the registry data. Such parental 
identification numbers were provided for all individuals born after 1960, but were incomplete for 
earlier birth cohorts (Boserup et al., 2013). 2) Parents had passed away before 1980, moved away 
from Denmark before 1980, or never lived in Denmark. Given that our information on wealth is 
available for the period 1980-2013, we do not have information on parental wealth in such cases.  
In this Online Appendix we present robustness checks that reduced concerns that the exclusion 
of these cases affected our conclusions. Figure A1 shows the percentage of unions formed in 
each year for which we did not identify all four parents in the dataset. The thick blue line 
represents the final sample used in the main analysis. The non-identification of parents can arise 
due to two main reasons:  
1) Parental identification numbers are not available for one of the four parents involved. The 
red dashed line indicates the share of cases that has parental id’s available for all parents. 
Between 12 and 21 percent of cases do not have parental identification numbers, and this 
is relatively stable across calendar time.   
2) Parents might have passed away or do not live in Denmark, and we did not manage to 
recover information on parental wealth from earlier years. The dashed blue line indicates 
cases where parents were not present in the data in the year of union formation. This 
applies to a bit less than 20% of the overall sample (difference between red and blue 
dashed lines). Whenever we were able to recover parental wealth from earlier waves (the 
last wave both parents were still alive), we pulled this wealth information forward after 
normalizing wealth within the distribution of the original year and included it in our 
wealth rank at union formation. This applies to less than 5% of cases. Robustness checks 
including these cases generated identical results (Figure 7). 
 
Even though the distribution of cases where parents were not identified is relatively stable across 
calendar time, this is not the case once looking at the distribution according to age. The left 
panes of Figures A2-A4 show how the availability of parental identification numbers declines 
steadily with age. Given that parental identification numbers were available for all individuals 
born after 1961 only, the age profile of missing parent id’s changes with calendar time. 
Especially in 1987, the start of our observation window, availability of parent id’s declines 
steeply with age. Given that availability of parent id’s drops to practically zero after age 35, we 
restricted our sample to unions formed before age 35. Things look a bit better in 1993, where we 
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also have cases aged 40 with parental identification numbers available. Robustness checks 
extending the analysis to unions formed before age 40 (See Figure B1) therefore start in 1993.   
Figure A1. Percentage of couples with at least one parent not identified; split by reason (missing 
parent id, parent not present in data in year of union formation)  
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Figure A2-A4. Percentage of couples with at least one parent not identified; split by reason 
(missing parent id, parent not present in data in year of union formation). By age for all sample, 
87 and 1993. 
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The changing age profile of missing parental identification numbers might influence our 
estimates of correlations in parental wealth across time. If older (or younger) couples are more 
likely to be homogomous, their underrepresentation in older cohorts might drive down (or up) 
the parental wealth correlation. To check whether this was of concern we re-ran our analysis 
where we reweighted couples based on the probability that the couple had all four parent 
identification numbers available in the data. This probability was calculated based on the 
percentage of individuals of a given birth cohort (by year) that had both parental identification 
numbers available. For each union formed, we multiplied the probability of both partners with 
each other and divided 1 by that quantity (i.e. 1/(probability male*probability female). These 
results were used to reweight the analysis in robustness checks. The second panes of Figures A1-
A4 show how missing parental identification numbers are more equally distributed across 
calendar time and age once reweighting. Figure A5 shows how including these weights in our 
analysis reproduces our main results of Figure 3 very well.  
Figure A5. Replication of Figure 6 including weights  
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Figure B1. Replication of main result with different age cut-off 
 
 
Note. Replication of Figure 6 expanding age range of partners included in the sample to 18-39 
years 
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Figure B2. Replication of main result excluding short-lived relationships 
 
Note. Replication of Figure 6 excluding cohabiting unions that lasted less than three years 
 
  
45 
 
Figure B3. Animated heatmap of relative frequency of particular couple combinations based on 
parental wealth 1987-2013 
 
 
Note. Parental wealth percentile at union formation within union cohort. Frequency indicates relative frequency of 
combination of parental wealth percentiles; a value of one indicates relative frequency as expected based on random 
mating.  
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